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Malicious Activity Simulation Tool (MAST) provides an on-the-job-training 
medium for information system operators to practice responding to cyber threats 
simulated on the operational information systems that they manage day-to-day. 
Because MAST has the capability to simulate various cyber attacks, it is 
important to measure the risk the system poses to the information systems on 
which it will operate.   
This thesis analyzes MAST’s security posture and proposes potential 
solutions to any vulnerability discovered in that analysis. The analysis is based 
on a Security Control Assessment (SCA) utilizing the Defense Information 
Systems Agency Application Security and Development Security Technical 
Implementation Guide. Following the SCA, a threat model is used to determine 
mitigations to technical findings. Outputs from this research will enable a more 
secure implementation of MAST. 
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Cybersecurity continues to be one of the most difficult challenges for the 
Department of Defense (DOD). Adversary tactics are always evolving, as are the 
information technology environments that they attack. Operators remain 
challenged to keep up with this tumult and must undergo constant training in 
order to remain competitive with their adversaries. Existing platforms, such as 
classroom training and various web- and computer-based training, offer a 
baseline of educational opportunity. However, they often do not provide 
experiences immediately and directly applicable to the environments operators 
regularly manage.  
Malicious Activity Simulation Tool (MAST) provides a unique opportunity 
for information system operators to seize on-the-job-training and practice 
responding to cyber threats simulated on the operational information systems 
that they manage day-to-day. MAST is a software suite that allows for simulated 
malware activity on operational platforms. It creates the opportunity for practical 
training of defending the information systems that operators are charged to 
operate, manage and protect. 
Before the MAST opportunity can be seized, it is important to measure the 
risk the system poses to the operational information systems (IS) that it will 
support. Particularly, due to MAST’s capability to simulate various cyber attacks, 
increased rigor must be exercised in its assessment. This need for specialized 
training is the driver for this thesis. 
A. OBJECTIVES  
The objective of this research is to analyze the security MAST’s security 
posture and propose potential solutions to any vulnerabilities and findings that 
are identified. Output from this research will form a roadmap for program 
managers, developers, and user representatives in preparing MAST for an 
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authority to operate (ATO) on operational IT platforms. An ATO is required before 
MAST can be fielded on any operational platform. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The assessment contained in this thesis follows the process discussed in 
[1]. Particular emphasis is on the unique risk MAST represents as a malware 
simulation platform designed to run on production and operational platforms such 
as ship or installation networks. Greater detail about how the analysis is 
conducted is discussed in Chapter III, Security Analysis Approach.  
C. BENEFITS OF THIS RESEARCH TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
AND DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
As previously stated, MAST is unique in both the mission it serves to 
accomplish and the risk it represents to the platforms and operators it would 
support. By conducting this assessment, we can create and then execute a 
roadmap to mitigate or eliminate the risks presented by MAST. This will pave the 
way for deployment of MAST onto it target networks and facilitate richer and 
more effective training for cyber operators. 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into several chapters, first introducing the 
research and the MAST system and then documenting the approach for its 
analysis, its findings, and ways to address those findings. It concludes with a 
summary of the analysis and what steps should follow this research. Further 
details about the chapters are as follows. 
Chapter I introduces the research, its objectives, and importance. Chapter 
II provides an overview of MAST as well as prior research on the program. It also 
provides a brief overview of a security analysis. Chapter III details specific 
activities, resources, tools, and techniques used in the security analysis of 
MAST. Chapter IV documents specific findings and vulnerabilities discovered in 
the security analysis. Chapter V presents techniques and recommendations for 
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addressing the vulnerabilities discovered in the security analysis. Chapter VI 
provides an executive summary of MAST’s security vulnerabilities and possible 
methods to address those findings as documented in Chapters IV and V.  
  
 3 




This chapter describes the architecture and usage of MAST and also 
describes the intended focus areas for the security analysis. [2], [3], and [4] each 
go into significant detail about MAST architecture, so only cursory coverage will 
be provided here. 
A. MAST ARCHITECTURE  
The MAST architecture is a three-tiered client server architecture, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. It features two server tiers and a client tier: the MAST 
Scenario Generation (SG) Server, the MAST Scenario Execution (SE) Server, 
and the MAST Clients.   
The architecture also utilizes two sets of files: client module files, referred 
to as Simware, and scenario files. Both sets are used to guide and execute 
scenarios for MAST.  
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MAST Scenario Execution Server




Figure 1.  Simplified MAST Architecture 
1. MAST Scenario Generation Server 
The SG Server is the highest tier in the system’s architecture. It installs as 
a simple Java-based desktop application. It provides the following capabilities 
and functions: 
• Maintains a master library of Simware and Scenario files 
• Deploys Simware and Scenario files to subordinate MAST SE 
Servers 
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• Provides for remote scenario management 
• Generates reports and aggregates  data from subordinate MAST 
SE 
2. MAST Scenario Execution Server 
The SE Server is the primary controller for a scenario at an operational 
platform. It is also the first MAST product to be deployed on an operation 
platform, as opposed to the SG Server, which need not be deployed on the 
operational platform and thus introduces a different risk to the operators’ mission. 
It provides the following capabilities and functions: 
• Maintains a local library of Simware and Scenario files 
• Deploys Simware and Scenario files to subordinate MAST Clients 
• Receives status and logs data from MAST Clients 
• Generates reports and data aggregates data from subordinate 
MAST Clients 
• Maintains MAST client and Simware status 
• Commands and controls all scenarios and MAST Clients 
• Performs “kill switch” functionality allowing for emergency shutdown 
of a scenario 
3. MAST Client 
The MAST Client is installed on each endpoint workstation running a 
Microsoft Windows operating system. It provides the following capabilities and 
functions: 
• Runs Simware as directed by MAST SE 
• Inventories host attributes, such as installed software and profiling 
information, such as Internet Protocol (IP) and Media Access 
Control (MAC) Addresses 
• Reports status on scenario to MAST SE 
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4. MAST Simware 
MAST Simware provides the muscle for each client to perform various 
malware simulations, including—but not necessarily limited to—port scans, 
antivirus triggers, and rogue pop-up advertisements. Requirements for Simware 
and each module’s capabilities and functions will vary widely and are often 
tailored for specific scenarios. 
5. Scenario Files 
MAST Scenario Files are intended to allow for pre-built and template 
scenarios to be issued from the SG Server. While not actual code, they script 
execution of MAST Simware across multiple clients.   
B. TRUST 
In this paper we use trust to encompass the ability for various parts of the 
MAST architecture, including operators and developers, to ensure confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability as protected throughout MAST and the operation of 
MAST. 
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability are the measures by which 
cybersecurity is assessed. The quality that security controls persevere in these 
areas can demonstrate how well an application or system protects itself, its data, 
and its users. Brief definitions of each of the three focus areas are as follows, as 
provided in [5]: 
• Confidentiality—The property that information is not disclosed to 
system entities (users, processes, devices) unless they have been 
authorized to access the information.  
• Integrity—The property whereby an entity has not been modified in 
an unauthorized manner.  
• Availability—The property of being accessible and usable upon 
demand by an authorized entity.  
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Trust, as it is referred to in this paper, roughly equates to the trust as a 
concept in [6]; trust is a property of an entity to do as it is specified. When 
measuring trust, we refer to an object’s trustworthiness. 
Trustworthiness of information systems such as MAST is measured by 
how the information system uses defenses—known as security controls—to 
defend itself against potential environmental and human driven threats, ranging 
from malfunction to malicious. A security control assessment evaluates the 
adequacy in which the security controls reduce risk.  
C. RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
A security control assessment produces the results and artifacts that are 
consumed in the Risk Management Framework (RMF) as documented in [7]. 
RMF replaces the Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification 
and Accreditation Process (DIACAP). The DOD RMF is better honed to build 
security functionality and management processes early into an information 
system’s life cycle and incorporate continuous monitoring of a system’s posture 
and risk well after its initial authorization to operate.  
The Risk Management Framework (RMF) consists of six steps. These 
steps are not necessarily required to be in this order, however, as the RMF was 
designed to align to a development life cycle this is the ideal order. It should be 
noted that RMF may be applied to a legacy system that is already fielded 
however some gap analysis and assessment may be required. 
The RMF steps are briefly discussed in the following sections. Since the 
focus of this thesis isn’t to analyze RMF, only a cursory discussion will be 






(1) Step 1: Categorize Information System 
In this step the system’s threats and the information types it processes are 
determined.  
(2) Step 2: Select Security Controls 
In this step the security controls that will be implemented to address 
system threats and information types it processes are determined. The system 
security plan and continuous monitoring strategy are also finalized. 
(3) Step 3: Implement Security Controls 
In this step security controls are implemented and deployed. Supporting 
documentation is also updated. 
(4) Step 4: Assess Security Controls 
In this step a security control assessment is conducted against the 
information system. The output is equivalent to the “certification” task of 
traditional C&A. 
(5) Step 5: Authorize Information System 
In this step, a Plan of Action and Milestones (POAM) is created based on 
findings from Step 4. A POAM and other artifacts are bundled together in a 
security authorization package, along with a risk determination and presented to 
an Authorizing Official for risk acceptance. This is equivalent to the 
“accreditation” task of traditional C&A. 
(6) Step 6: Monitor Security Controls 
In this step typical system maintenance occurs to include configuration 
management and vulnerability management. Outstanding POAM items are also 
addressed.  
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D. SECURITY CONTROL ASSESSMENT 
As defined in The Committee on National Security Systems National 
Information Assurance (IA) Glossary [5], a security control assessment (SCA) is: 
The testing and/or evaluation of the management, operational, and 
technical security controls to determine the extent to which the 
controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and 
producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security 
requirements for the system or enterprise. 
The practice of conducting a security control assessment is typically a 
critical step in acquiring authorization to operate an information system. For 
example, [8] requires that IT Product Information System Security Managers 
(ISSM) ensure their system undergoes a SCA. 
The SCA conducted on MAST as part of the research for this thesis 
comprises the [1]. Further details on how the STIG is applied to MAST will be 
discussed in Chapter III, Security Control Assessment Approach. 
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III. SECURITY CONTROL ASSESSMENT APPROACH 
The ASD STIG [1] remains the core component of the SCA conducted in 
this research. It represents significant research in an application development life 
cycle within the DOD, drawing on knowledge and capability from resources such 
as the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Microsoft Corporation, 
the MITRE Corporation, and the Open Web Application Security Project 
(OWASP) [1]. 
The ASD STIG [1] divides an SCA into five areas built around a Software 
Development Life Cycle (SDLC). The advantage to this approach is that 
application developers can advance with greater ease through development and 
implementation of the STIG as they develop their application. 
Areas in [1] that are not applicable to MAST are omitted from discussion in 
this chapter. For example, security concerns specific to web technologies will not 
be discussed as those technologies are not in use by MAST. 
A. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
Program management focuses on planning functions of an application’s 
development. Of the 158 tests in [1], 16 emphasize program management. 
Analysis steps in this area focus on system documentation and planning 
processes, as well as the beginning stages of application deployment. 
Interestingly, half of the checks that apply to program management also apply to 
deployment. 
(1) Documentation 
The first stage of reviewing for program management considerations 
includes documentation review. Particular artifacts to assess include:  
• System Security Plan (SSP)—A keystone artifact that documents 
all security aspects of a program. It is often a primary artifact in a 
package forwarded to an authorizing official when applying for an 
authority to operate. 
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• Application Configuration Guide—A document that captures how an 
application is to be deployed in its target environment. It often also 
includes information on securing the application in accordance with 
the controls and capabilities documented in the SSP. 
• Information System Categorization—This is the determination of 
system’s confidentiality, Integrity, and availability requirements.  
• Security Classification Guide—For systems that process classified 
information, this document should detail what data elements are 
actually classified, their classification, and handling instructions. 
• Coding Standards—This artifact informs developers of expectations 
for producing source code. Details vary from naming conventions to 
spacing and readability. 
Program management tests also include a review of training and 
maintenance program maturity. 
(2) Education and Training 
Education and training material is expected to be developed for various 
stakeholders tied to development of an information system. This includes 
managers, developers, and testers. As the focus of program management at this 
stage is development of a product, training for systems users is not considered in 
scope. 
(3) Application Maintenance 
Application Maintenance addresses processes that support the application 
through discovery and remediation of flaws. 
B. DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
Design and development focuses on the actual creation of an information 
system. Of the 158 tests in [1], 103 pertain to design and development, by far the 
largest focus for the guide. Analysis steps in this area focus on assessing how 
well security was built in throughout creation of the information system and range 




The first stage of reviewing for design and development considerations 
includes documentation review. Particular artifacts to assess include: 
• Design Document—This artifact addresses the information 
systems’ architecture. It has several security related requirements 
dealing with interfaces, authentication, and information types. 
• Application Configuration Guide—This is the same document 
identified in program management. 
• Threat Model—This artifact represents the efforts made by the 
developer to identify threats that an information system may 
encounter and based on the risk each threat represents, determine 
adequate controls against those threats. It is not uncommon for the 
threat model to be a component of the design document.  
(2) Best Practices 
The next area in the design and development consideration includes 
various steps and measures that improve the security of an information system 
but do not fit into any of the other areas discussed later in the chapter. This 
includes: 
• Removal of “dead code.”  Dead code is code that has no path for 
execution. 
• Separation of data and presentation services. A common example 
of meeting this requirement would be installing web servers and 
database servers on separate hardware or systems. 
• Quality assurance measures such as ensuring that directories and 
file paths are valid. 
• Application clean up measures such as deleting temporary files at 
the end of application sessions.  
• Secure default configurations such that when the application is 
installed or deployed it is already configured to be as secure as 
possible. 
• Comprehensive error handlings so that application failure does not 
allow the application to enter into an insecure state.  
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(3) Cryptography 
The cryptography area assesses whether or not approved cryptographic 
algorithms and technologies are utilized by an information system, where 
encryption is required. Particular requirements mandate certification and National 
Security Agency (NSA) approval for classified communications [9]. 
(4) Data 
The data area assesses how the application stores and transmits data as 
well as how it connects to its data sources. The ASD STIG [1] requires 
encryption of data at rest and in transit. 
(5) Authentication 
The authentication area assesses how an application performs 
identification of users and resources. This part of the assessment has checks 
that vary depending on the technology and authentication requirements for the 
application. For example, a desktop application that does not utilize networking 
technologies will have far fewer requirements than a typical web server/ 
database server application. 
(6) Access Control 
The access control area assesses how an application grants access to 
various parts of itself. This part of the assessment reviews access control models 
and principles, particularly role-based access control and least privilege 
principles. 
(7) Input Validation 
Within design and development considerations, input validation assesses 
how an application verifies the validity of any data that crosses its trust boundary. 
This part of the assessment reviews how the application has established criteria 
for acceptable input and how it defends itself against known input validation 
exploits. Particular vulnerabilities of interest are: 
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• SQL Injection Vulnerabilities—Vulnerabilities where an attacker 
manipulates application queries in order to modify or access data or 
direct other unauthorized activity of the database or application 
servers. 
• Integer Arithmetic Vulnerabilities—Vulnerabilities where an 
application generates unpredictable results from integer math. This 
occurs due to the nature of integers having multiple sizes, 
signed/unsigned variants, and overflow properties. 
• Format String Vulnerabilities—Vulnerabilities where an attacker 
passes string values specifically formatted for actions for which the 
application is not designed. 
• Command Injection Vulnerabilities—Vulnerabilities where an 
attacker uses a data injection vulnerability to execute arbitrary 
commands via the application. 
• Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerabilities—Vulnerabilities where an 
attacker uploads malicious code to a vulnerable website, allowing 
for a third party victim to be exploited. 
• Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Vulnerabilities—Vulnerabilities 
where an attacker uses specially crafted HTML to abuse persistent 
authentication a user may have to another application. 
• Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities—Vulnerabilities where an attacker 
may write data beyond the allocated memory of the buffer with 
which he or she is interacting. 
(8) Canonical Representation 
The canonical representation assesses how an application handles the 
name representation of a resource. This vulnerability is most common for files 
where the operating systems on which the application resides may have multiple 
ways to represent such files. 
(9) Application Information Disclosure 
The application information disclosure area assesses the extent to which 
an application limits disclosure of information that aids an attacker in exploiting 
the application. Poorly designed applications will disclose valuable information 
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that facilitates a simpler reconnaissance for an attacker, increasing the likelihood 
of compromise. 
(10) Race Conditions 
The race conditions area assesses how well an application manages 
multiple processes and or threads in an application. Race conditions become 
most common when multiple processes or threads need access to a single 
resource. 
(11) Auditing 
The auditing area assesses how well an application audits its behavior 
and that of the users and resources that interact with it.   
(12) Mobile Code 
The mobile code assesses the application’s use of mobile code. The 
Committee on National Security Systems National Information Assurance (IA) 
Glossary [5] defines mobile code as: 
Software programs or parts of programs obtained from remote 
information systems, transmitted across a network, and executed 
on a local information system without explicit installation or 
execution by the recipient. 
(13) Internet Protocol Version 6 
The Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPV6) area in the design and 
development considerations assesses whether an application is capable of 
operating in an IPV6 environment as well as how well it maintains its 





C. SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
Software Configuration Management (SCM) considerations focus on the 
creation of an information system. Of the 158 tests in [1], only 4 emphasize SCM. 
Analysis steps in this area focus on assessing how well configuration of the 
application was managed over the course of its development life cycle. 
(1) Software Configuration Management Plan 
The SCM plan area assesses the maturity of the SCM program. The key 
artifact for this review is the SCM plan. The SCM Plan is expected to identify a 
myriad of relevant data regarding the application including:  
• Roles and responsibilities during development of the application. 
• Tools, techniques and methodologies used to develop the 
application.  
• Version and release schedules for the application. 
(2) Configuration Control Board (CCB). 
The Configuration Control Board (CCB) area assesses the establishment 
of a CCB. 
(3) File Integrity 
The file integrity assesses what measures ensure secure transfer of 
application files. Cryptographic hash technology is used to determine whether or 
not files have been tampered with.  
D. TESTING CONSIDERATIONS 
Testing considerations focus on the security-focused testing of an 
information system. Of the 158 tests in [1], only 11 are specific to testing. 
Analysis steps in this area focus on identifying security issues before the 
application is released. For the purpose of this research functional testing and 
other types of testing are not considered. 
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(1) Test Plans and Procedures 
The test plans and procedure area assesses whether or not test 
procedures have been created and executed before release of the software and 
also ensures those tests are executed regularly.  
(2) Fuzz Testing 
The fuzz testing area assesses whether the application has had its various 
data input vectors tested for tolerance to malicious data.   
(3) Code Coverage 
The code coverage area assesses how completely security testing 
addresses the application as a percentage of total code. Program and Test 
managers seek to get as close to 100% as possible with low test values 
indicating a flaw in the test program.  
(4) Code Reviews 
The code review area assesses the processes used to review source 
code of the application. While code review typically addresses functional issues 
in the application, in this context security issues are the only focus. 
E. DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
Deployments considerations focus on security concerns of the application 
after is has been released and has been deployed to its intended operating 
environment. Of the 158 tests in [1], 48 emphasize on deployment issues.   
(1) Documentation 
The first stage of reviewing for deployment considerations includes 
documentation review. The first three documents should have been assessed in 
the program management considerations review and the last in design and 
development considerations review. Particular artifacts to assess include:  
• System Security Plan (SSP)  
• Application Configuration Guide  
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• Security Classification Guide  
• Threat Model 
(2) Third-Party Software 
The third party software area in the deployment considerations assesses 
how third party products are configured and hardened when deployed with the 
application. 
(3) Ports and Protocols 
The ports and protocols area assesses what ports and protocols an 
application with network capabilities uses for communication. Both secure use 
and registration in the DOD Ports, Protocols, and Services database are 
assessed. 
(4) Workplace Security Procedures 
The workplace security procedures area assesses traditional security 
measures implemented to protect physical assets of the application. 
(5) Unnecessary Services 
The unnecessary services area reviews removal or disabling services and 
protocols not in use by the application. 
(6) Application Maintenance 
The application maintenance area assesses the framework to support the 
application during and after deployment. Here vulnerability and patch 
management programs are reviewed.  
(7) Security Incident Response Process 
The security incident response process area assesses the maturity of the 




(8) Denial of Service 
The Denial of Service (DoS) area assesses the applications resilience to 
DoS attacks. A DoS attack is any malicious activity designed to impede the 
availability of its target. The assessment includes both resilience of the 
application and the environment in which it is installed. 
(9) Access Control 
The access control area assesses the permissions and configuration of 
application files. In particular, the assessment determines if the application 
configuration files are configured such that only authorized personnel my modify 
them. 
(10) Database Exports 
The database exports area assesses the processes in place to ensure 
exports of the deployed production database to an application are purged of any 
sensitive information before being used in development or testing environments. 
(11) Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Configuration 
The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificate configuration area assesses 
whether or not the application has been configured to utilize the DOD PKI for 
authentication and only that infrastructure.  
(12) Auditing 
The auditing area assesses the depth and breadth of application audit 
logging as well as how those logs are protected and maintained. 
(13) Recovery and Contingency Planning 
The recovery and contingency planning area assesses the completeness 
of the application continuity plans including all relevant recovery procedures. 
(14) Account Management 
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The account management area assesses established processes for 
account use, creation, modification and deletion. Some of the areas of focus 
include: 
• Password security 
• Password complexity 
• Shared user accounts 
• Privileged access 
• Service and Application accounts 
• Least privilege policies 
(15) Infrastructure Compliance 
The infrastructure compliance area in the deployment considerations 
assesses the documented and confirmed security requirements and compliance 
with those security requirements for the environment that hosts the application. 
(16) Enclave Demilitarized Zone 
The enclave Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) area assesses placement of 
application that communicates across external enclave boundaries in a DMZ. 
(17) DOD DMZ 
The infrastructure compliance area assesses placement of an Internet 
facing application within specially demarcated DMZ for outside the Department of 
Defense Information Networks (DODIN) 
F. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the SCA approach used in this research was discussed. 
The five consideration areas, program management, design and development, 
software configuration management, testing, and deployment, were enumerated, 
including the focus areas that compose them. The following chapter will describe 
the findings that result from applying this SCA approach to MAST. 
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IV. ASSESSMENT FINDINGS 
Findings discovered during this research are organized as they are in [1]. 
As outlined in Appendix A, some findings apply to multiple considerations; those 
findings will be annotated and discussed in both areas that they apply to. 
A. ASSESSMENT ORGANIZATION 
Each STIG Item, represented by a unique SITG ID later in the chapter, is 
assessed a raw severity category by [1]. Table 1, DISA Severities, lists those 
severities.   
Table 1.   DISA Severities, after [1] 
 
 
A result from a particular STIG check will be one of the statuses identified 
in Table 2, STIG Check Status. Typically SCAs focus on findings vice satisfied 
requirements, so unless there is an item of particular interest, only open findings 





Table 2.   STIG Check Status 
 
 
B. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
The SCA for MAST culminated in the overall findings described in Table 3, 
Overall Summary of Findings. With nine (9) open CAT I findings, MAST is 
considered to have High Risk. 







C. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT FINDINGS 
Table 4, Summary of Program Management Findings, provides a numeric 
summary of the findings in program management. 
Table 4.   Summary of Program Management Findings 
 
 
Table 5, Program Management Findings Details, describes specific 
findings related to program management. The findings are non-technical in 
nature. While this may be disarming initially, findings here will generate systemic 
vulnerability throughout the entire life cycle of the application. 
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D. DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT FINDINGS 
Table 6, Summary of Design and Development Findings, provides a 
numerical summary of the findings in design and development. 
Table 6.   Summary of Design and Development Findings 
 
 
Table 7, Design and Development Findings Details, describes specific 








Table 7.   Design and Development Findings Details, after [1] 
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E. SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT FINDINGS 
Table 8, Summary of Software Configuration Management Findings, 
provides a numeric summary of the findings in software configuration 
management. 
Table 8.   Summary of Software Configuration Management Findings 
 
 
Table 9, Software Configuration Management Findings Details, describes 
specific findings in software configuration management. The findings are non-






























F. TESTING FINDINGS 
Table 10, Summary of Testing Findings, provides a numerical summary of 
the findings in testing. 
Table 10.   Summary of Testing Findings 
 
 
Table 11, Testing Findings Details, describes specific findings testing. The 
findings are non-technical in nature. 
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G. DEPLOYMENT FINDINGS 
Table 12, Summary of Deployment Findings, provides a numerical 
summary of the findings in deployment. 
Table 12.   Summary of Deployment Findings 
 
 
Table 13, Deployment Findings Details, describes the specific findings of 
deployment. These findings typically apply to applications later in their life cycle 














Table 13.   Deployment Findings Details, after [1] 
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In this chapter, the results of the SCA of MAST were enumerated. As 
documented in Table 3. Overall Summary of Findings, MAST had 9 CAT I, 62 
CAT II, and 6 CAT III findings. Typically CAT III findings are overlooked in DoN 
SCA practice. The CAT I and CAT II findings, however, require mitigation efforts. 
Chapter V documents a threat model approach to the address the most 
dangerous vulnerabilities in MAST. 
 48 
V. MITIGATION AND REMEDIATION THROUGH THREAT 
MODELING 
This chapter describes architecture changes and vulnerability mitigations 
to improve MAST’s overall security posture.   
In order to deploy effective vulnerability mitigations to an application its 
threat model must be understood. A threat model is a representation of threats to 
an application, prioritization those threats, and application of countermeasures 
and mitigations. A threat model must be conducted early in an application 
development life cycle. 
For MAST, or any DOD system, some threat modeling burden is relieved 
via the application and implementation of DISA STIGs. The STIGs are designed 
to address vulnerabilities commonly found in “the wild.” For example, according 
to [12], the top application vulnerability is injection flaws such as SQL injections 
attacks for web applications. To address this common weakness, [1] has multiple 
checks for input validation and injection attack defense. Despite this “pre-
completed” modeling.   
For the purpose of this research a threat model is created and analyzed 
under the context of improving MAST’s security posture. Unlike typical threat 
models which are intended to occur as part of the design process, this threat 
model will be used to funnel security posture improvement effort into major areas 
of concern. Again, as the research is conducted outside of MAST’s development 
process, some tailoring liberty is required to model after the fact; such tailoring 
will be explained as needed. Also, the intent is not to include detailed tutorial on 
threat modeling but rather utilize existing techniques, as such general detail on 
how to build a threat model should be sought through other resources. 
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A. THREAT MODEL BASICS 
According to [13], there are nine steps to developing a security model: 
1. Define use scenarios 
2. List external dependencies 
3. Define security assumptions 
4. Create external security notes 
5. Create data flow diagrams (DFD) 
6. Determine threat types 
7. Identify threats to the system 
8. Determine risk 
9. Plan mitigations 
The following sections establish the threat model for MAST. 
B. MAST USE SCENARIOS 
A Use Scenario describes how the subject of a threat model is used.   
As discussed in Chapter II, MAST is a desktop application designed to 
simulate malware on operational platforms. It consists of three desktop 
application components in a three-tier architecture in which modules called 
Simware and Scenario files are passed between the tiers to execute simulations.   
C. MAST EXTERNAL DEPENDENCIES 
External dependencies in the context of threat models are other pieces of 
software and hardware that are not within the scope of the software being 




As MAST is designed to be deployed to operational platforms its external 
dependencies vary wildly. Some predictable expectations include:  
• Installation on a Microsoft Windows operating system  
• Dependency on the Java virtual machine to run 
• Networking support 
D. MAST SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS 
Security assumptions are prerequisites and expectations the software 
being modeled may have for it dependencies and environment, particularly in the 
support of security. Examples might include encryption services and file 
permissions implemented by a hosting operating system. 
In the case of MAST, no security assumptions can be made based on the 
documentation available at the time of this research. 
E. MAST DATA FLOW DIAGRAMS 
DFDs demonstrate how the application interacts with its own components 
and external interfaces.  
Several DFDs are required to describe MAST. DFD elements are 
numbered to facilitate discussion. 
Figure 2, MAST DFD with MAST Components, shows how the various 
components of MAST interact for command and control (C2). This data flow 
demonstrates how the various tiers of MAST communicate. To meet the needs of 
this exercise, only “Request” and “Response” transaction need be modeled. In 
this DFD, a request is an instruction from one tier of MAST to a lower tier. The 





































Figure 2.  MAST DFD with MAST Components  
Figure 3, MAST Simware and Scenario File Distribution, shows how 
MAST Simware and Scenario files are passed from the MAST SG Server to the 















































Figure 4.  MAST DFD with User 
Figure 4, MAST DFD with User, shows user interaction with the MAST SG 
Sever and MAST SE Server however due to MAST being a desktop application; 
this particular DFD will not be used. It is only provided for completion. 
Each DFD’s items are numbered to facilitate discussion throughout the 
threat model. When an item appears in multiple models its number assignment is 
consistent. 
F. MAST THREAT TYPES 
This stage of threat modeling determines how to categorize threat types. 
This categorization is crucial for the next step of the model. The simplest 
approach utilizes the threats to confidentiality, integrity, and availability where 
threats are categorized by their impact to those classic security pillars. This is the 
approach that is used in this research. Threat type definitions are as follows: 
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• Confidentiality Threats—Threats that allow for information 
disclosure and access to unauthorized parties 
• Integrity Threats—Threats that allow for modification of data by 
unauthorized entities or in an unauthorized manner 
• Availability Threats—Threats that affect the accessibility of 
authorized entities 
G. IDENTIFY THREATS TO MAST 
Threat identification consists of mapping of the established threat types to 
elements or data flows between elements. Table 14, DFD Item Inventory, lists 
each item in the DFDs. The “Boundary Gap” DFD Elements Type is a unique 
type used for the purpose of MAST threat model. It acts as a place holder for 
whenever data flowed outside the application boundary. Its significance will be 
discussed later in the paper. 
Table 14.   DFD Item Inventory 
DFD Elements Types DFD Item Numbers 
External Entities User (10) 
Processes 
SG Server (1) 
SE Server (2) 
MAST Client (3) 
Simware (4) 
Data Flows 
SG to SE Request (1→2) 
SE to SG Response (2→1) 
SE to Client Request (2→3) 
Client to SE Response (3→2) 
Client to Simware Request (3→4) 
Simware to Client Response (4→3) 
SG to SE Simware/Scenario Download (1→2) 
SE to Client Simware/Scenario Download (2→3) 
User to SG Request (10→1) 
SG to User Response (1→10) 
User to SE Request (10→2) 
SE to User Response (2→10) 
Boundary GAP Trust Boundary Gap (5) Trust Boundary Gap (6) 
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In order to simplify and reduce the redundancy and complexity of the 
model, similar data paths can be collapsed as a single dataflow. Table 15, 
Reduced DFD Item Inventory, shows an inventory where common data flows are 
simplified. 
Table 15.   Reduced DFD Item Inventory 
DFD Elements Types DFD Item Numbers 
External Entities User (10) 
Processes SG Server (1) 
SE Server (2) 
MAST Client (3) 
Simware (4) 
Data Flows SG to SE C2 (1→2) 
SE to Client C2 (2→3) 
Client to Simware C2 (3→4) 
SG to SE Simware/Scenario Download (1→2) 
SE to Client Simware/Scenario Download (2→3) 
Boundary GAP Trust Boundary Gap (5) 
Trust Boundary Gap (6) 
 
Table 16, Threats to MAST, shows a simplified listing of the threats that 
MAST must defend against. 
Table 16.   Threats to MAST 
Threat Type Effected DFD Item 
Confidentiality SG to SE C2 and Downloads (1→2) 
SE to Client C2 and Downloads (2→3) 
Integrity SG to SE C2 and Downloads (1→2) 





H. DETERMINE RISK TO MAST 
Once threats have been established, the risk those threats pose to the 
subject system must be determined. This helps prioritize resources to remediate 
and mitigate vulnerabilities. 
There are many methodologies available to assess risk of a threat. To 
keep aligned with this research’s DOD SCA focus, severities from [1] are used to 
assess the risk of vulnerabilities.   
The Confidentiality threat risk is established in the following controls from 
[1] where the SCA generated findings: 
• APP3250—High Risk 
• APP3330—High Risk 
• APP3340—High Risk 
• APP3405—High Risk 
• APP3210—Medium Risk 
• APP3260—Medium Risk 
• APP3150—Medium Risk 
• APP3170—Medium Risk 
• APP3220—Medium Risk 
• APP3900—Medium Risk 
• APP3950—Medium Risk 
• APP2070—Low Risk 
In accordance with DOD risk management practice the highest risk rating 
of any particular control becomes the risk rating of any group controls of which it 
is a part. In this risk model, Confidentiality related controls were grouped 
together. Because several controls are high risk per [1], the overall risk of the 
group is high risk 
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The Integrity threat risk is established in the following controls from [1] 
where the SCA generated findings: 
• APP3700—Medium Risk 
• APP3710—Medium Risk 
• APP3720—Medium Risk 
• APP3730—Medium Risk 
• APP3740—Medium Risk 
• APP3750—Medium Risk 
These STIG severities require that these risks be assessed as medium 
risk. As in the Confidentiality section, Integrity related controls were grouped 
together in the risk model, and the highest risk assessed to any of the controls is 
medium. Thus, the overall risk of the Integrity group is medium 
Due to the sensitive nature of MASTs purpose, simulating malware on 
operational platforms, thereby reducing the risk beyond the severity in [1] without 
taking technical measure to actually closing the finding is inappropriate. 
I. PLAN MITIGATIONS FOR MAST 
Once risks have been prioritized and measured, mitigation should follow. 
Risk response typically has several different approaches and these approaches 
can be mixed and blended to serve the purpose of the program or organization. 
As defined in [14], these approaches are:  
• Risk Acceptance—This risk response approach occurs when a 
program or organization tolerates the risk as assessed and takes 
no measures to change the risk as it is assessed. 
• Risk Avoidance—This risk response approach is the result of a 
program or organization halting the activity or endeavor that causes 
the risk to be generated in the first place.   
• Risk Mitigation—This risk response approach is due to the program 
or organization taking measures to reduce the risk or otherwise 
alter the risk as it is assessed.  
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• Risk Sharing or Transfer—This risk response approach is selected 
when the program or organization uses a third party to absorb 
some or all of the risk as assessed. Typically this strategy is related 
to insurance.  
Changes to system architecture and other technical improvements to an 
IS are considered risk mitigations. Thus, for the purpose of this research, only 
mitigations to risk will be discussed. 
(1) Application Tier-to-Tier Trust 
MAST is designed as a three-tiered application with each tier having a 
network stack and capability of being placed on separate hosts. This separation 
injects “trust boundaries” outside of which MAST cannot guarantee the 
confidentiality and integrity of the communications between its components. 
In order to meet the confidentiality and integrity needs, encryption needs 
to be deployed. MAST uses the java.net library for communication between its 
three tiers; specifically the Socket and ServerSocket classes are used. This is, of 
course, the unencrypted socket library. The Java language has an SSL library, 
javax.net.ssl, with SSLSocket and SSLServerSocket classes [15]. These libraries 
can very rapidly provide for the encryption and in turn confidentiality and integrity 
needs of MAST. 
In addition to encryption, an authentication scheme must be deployed to 
ensure clients and servers within MAST communicate with only the entities that 
are intended. There is no simple solution here. MAST would need to undergo a 
significant change to support an authentication scheme. As MAST is designed to 
run on an operational platform with built in communication capabilities, it may be 
designed to utilize a symmetric encryption and inherit public key infrastructure 
(PKI) capabilities for key and password distribution. 
(2) Simware Trust 
Simware are the core of the MAST architecture. These modules perform 
the actual simulation of malicious activity. MAST Clients execute Simware with 
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no validation of source or capabilities of module. There is little to stop MAST from 
being a botnet vice a learning tool due to the absence of these validation 
capabilities. Code signing and validation technologies could be used to mitigate 
this finding.  
J. THREAT MODEL LIMITATIONS 
Threat models will only directly model threats of a technical nature. Issues 
related to Program Management, Configuration Management, and early design 
decisions and related rigor will not be apparent unless subjected to a SCA or 
similar audit. Many of the findings discovered in the SCA are attributable to 
nontechnical issues, thus mitigations in this area are relatively simple as MAST is 
so early in its development life cycle. 
Table 17, Mitigations Not Found in Threat Model, provides overview of 
findings that would not be apparent in a threat model and also proposes 
mitigations to those findings. 
Table 17.   Mitigations Not Found in Threat Model, after [1] 
STIG ID 
Severity 




The Program Manager will 
ensure a System Security 
Plan (SSP) is established to 
describe the technical, 
administrative, and 
procedural IA program and 
policies governing the DOD 
information system, and 
identifying all IA personnel 
and specific IA requirements 
and objectives.  
Develop a System Security Plan 
(SSP) that addresses 
implementation of all IA controls and 









The Program Manager will 
provide an Application 
Configuration Guide to the 
application hosting providers 
to include a list of all 
potential hosting enclaves 
and connection rules and 
requirements.  
Develop a Application Configuration 
Guide that describes how to deploy 
MAST to a target system or host. 
APP2040 
Medium 
If the application contains 
classified data, the Program 
Manager will ensure a 
Security Classification Guide 
exists containing data 
elements and their 
classification. 
Develop a Security Classification 
Guide describing data elements 




The Program Manager will 
ensure the system has been 
assigned specific MAC and 
confidentiality levels. 
Assign a MAC and confidentiality 
levels for MAST. 
APP2060 
Medium 
The Program Manager will 
ensure the development 
team follows a set of coding 
standards. 
Establish  coding standards for the 
MAST development team 
APP2100 
Medium 
The Program Manager and 
designer will ensure the 
application design complies 
with the DOD Ports and 
Protocols guidance. 
Design MAST to comply with  DOD 
Ports and Protocols guidance. This 
will include proper registration of 




The Program Manager and 
designer will ensure the 
application is registered with 
the DOD Ports and Protocols 
Database. 
Design MAST to comply with  DOD 
Ports and Protocols guidance. This 
will include proper registration of 




The Program Manager will 
ensure all levels of program 
management, designers, 
developers, and testers 
receive the appropriate 
security training pertaining to 
their job function.  
Ensure all personnel supporting 
MAST receive at a minimum security 
awareness training. Additional 
training might include secure 
software development and secure 








The Program Manager will 
ensure a vulnerability 
management process is in 
place to include ensuring a 
mechanism is in place to 
notify users, and users are 
provided with a means of 
obtaining security updates 
for the application. 
Develop a vulnerability management 
process such that MAST users are 
notified of updates and have a 
means go acquiring updates. 
APP2140 
Medium 
The Program Manager will 
ensure a security incident 
response process for the 
application is established 
that defines reportable 
incidents and outlines a 
standard operating 
procedure for incident 
response to include 
Information Operations 
Condition (INFOCON). 
Develop an incident response 
process for MAST that outlines and 
to resolve and report incidents that 
affect the application.  
APP2150 
Medium 
The Program Manager will 
ensure procedures are 
implemented to assure 
physical handling and 
storage of information is in 
accordance with the data’s 
sensitivity. 
Develop procedures for secure 
handling of MAST physical media. 
APP2160 
Medium 
The Program Manager and 
IAO will ensure development 
systems, build systems, test 
systems, and all components 
comply with all appropriate 
DOD STIGs, NSA guides, 
and all applicable DOD 
policies. The Test Manager 
will ensure both client and 
server machines are STIG 
compliant. 
Configure MAST development and 
testing environments to meet and 
comply with all appropriate DOD 
STIGs, NSA guides, and all 
applicable DOD policies.  
APP3010 
Medium 
The designer will create and 
update the Design Document 
for each release of the 
application. 
Develop and execute processes that 
keep application design 
documentation update with each 








The designer will ensure 
threat models are 
documented and reviewed 
for each application release 
and updated as required by 
design and functionality 
changes or new threats are 
discovered. 
Develop threat models to properly 
represent the threats that face 
MAST. The model built for this 




The Designer will ensure the 
application removes 
temporary storage of files 
and cookies when the 
application is terminated. 
Design MAST to remove any 
temporary files that it may create. 
This would include removal of 
Simware files that are downloaded 
to clients during routine MAST use. 
APP3230 
Medium 
The designer will ensure the 
application properly clears or 
overwrites all memory blocks 
used to process sensitive 
data, if required by the 
information owner, and 
clears or overwrites all 
memory blocks used for 
classified data. 
Design MAST to overwrite any 
memory it utilizes. Because MAST 
has the potential to gleam sensitive 
information as it runs its simulations, 
it must clean up and reference to 




The designer will ensure all 
access authorizations to data 
are revoked prior to initial 
assignment, allocation or 
reallocation to an unused 
state. 
MAST has no authorization or 
authentication process, making 
compliance with this requirement 
impossible. Ensure design of a 
subsequent authorization or 




The designer will ensure the 
application has the capability 
to mark sensitive/classified 
output when required. 
MAST has no Security Classification 
Guide and no indicator for what 
confidentiality it will operate at, thus 
it cannot meet the capability to mark 
sensitive/classified output when 
required. Satisfy the Security 
Classification Guide and 




The designer will ensure 
applications requiring server 
authentication are PK-
enabled.  
MAST is likely not a likely  candidate 
for PKI enablement and as such, a 








The designer and IAO will 
ensure application resources 
are protected with 
permission sets which allow 
only an application 
administrator to modify 
application resource 
configuration files. 
MAST, as a desktop application, 
likely does not need to provide any 
additional protection to its resources 
beyond what is already provided by 
its host. Including configuration for 
this in the Application Configuration 
Guide would resolve this finding. 
APP3470 
Medium 
The designer will ensure the 
application is organized by 
functionality and roles to 
support the assignment of 
specific roles to specific 
application functions.  
MAST, as a desktop application, 
likely does not need to support this 
functionality. Including configuration 
for roles in the application 




The designer will ensure 
access control mechanisms 
exist to ensure data is 
accessed and changed only 
by authorized personnel.  
MAST, as a desktop application, 
likely does not need to support this 
functionality. Including configuration 
for access control mechanisms in 
the application configuration guide 
would resolve this finding. 
APP3500 
Medium 
The designer will ensure the 
application executes with no 
more privileges than 
necessary for proper 
operation. 
MAST’s application configuration 
guide must document that it 
executes with no more privileges 
than necessary for proper operation. 
Actual installation must support this 
as well. Because MAST will emulate 
and simulate threatening behavior 
by design, it will need advanced 
privileged access on the hosts it is 
deployed. This must be documented 
and understood clearly. 
APP3510 
High 
The designer will ensure the 
application validates all 
input. 
All MAST input fields must validate 
input. Code review processes can 
find these issues and also 
demonstrate their resolution. Test 
plans must be developed, executed, 









The designer will ensure the 
application is not vulnerable 
to integer arithmetic issues. 
All MAST input fields must validate 
input. Code review processes can 
find these issues and also 
demonstrate their resolution. Test 
plans must be developed, executed, 




The designer will ensure the 
application does not contain 
format string vulnerabilities. 
All MAST input fields must validate 
input. Code review processes can 
find these issues and also 
demonstrate their resolution. Test 
plans must be developed, executed, 




The designer will ensure the 
application does not allow 
command injection. 
All MAST input field must validate 
input. Code review processes can 
find these issues and also 
demonstrate their resolution. Test 
plans must be developed, executed, 




The designer will ensure the 
application does not have 
buffer overflows, use 
functions known to be 
vulnerable to buffer 
overflows, and does not use 
signed values for memory 
allocation where permitted 
by the programming 
language. 
All MAST input fields must validate 
input. Code review processes can 
find these issues and also 
demonstrate their resolution. Test 
plans must be developed, executed, 




The designer will ensure the 
application has no canonical 
representation 
vulnerabilities. 
All MAST input fields must validate 
input. Code review processes can 
find these issues and also 
demonstrate their resolution. Test 
plans must be developed, executed, 









The designer will ensure the 
application does not disclose 
unnecessary information to 
users. 
MAST will present users with stack 
traces on some errors. Code review 
processes can find these issues and 
also demonstrate their resolution. 
Corrections include updating try-
catch blocks to address errors more 
cleanly and ensuring all potential 
errors are caught. 
APP3630 
Medium 
The designer will ensure the 
application is not vulnerable 
to race conditions. 
Code review processes find these 
issues and also demonstrate their 
resolution. Test plans must be 
developed, executed, and include 
tests for this kind of vulnerability. 
APP3670 
Medium 
The designer will ensure the 
application has a capability 
to display the user’s time and 
date of the last change in 
data content. 
Develop robust logging for MAST. 
With the current minimal logging 
capabilities, MAST cannot display 
the user’s time and date of the last 
change in data content. 
APP3680 
Medium 
The designer will ensure the 
application design includes 
audits on all access to need-
to-know information and key 
application events. 
Develop robust logging for MAST. 
Mast has only minimal logging 
capabilities and cannot support 
audits on access to need-to-know 
information and events. 
APP3690 
Medium 
The designer and IAO will 
ensure the audit trail is 
readable only by the 
application and auditors and 
protected against 
modification and deletion by 
unauthorized individuals. 
Develop robust logging for MAST. 
Mast has only minimal logging 
capabilities.   
APP3960 
Medium 
The designer will ensure the 
application is compliant with 
all DOD IT Standards 
Registry (DISR) IPv6 
profiles. 
Java has IPv6 support built in and 
will attempt to handle IPv6/IPv4 
issues seamlessly, however 
application test plans need to be 




The designer will ensure 
supporting application 
services and interfaces have 
been designed, or upgraded 
for, IPv6 transport.  
Java has IPv6 support built in and 
will attempt to handle IPv6/IPv4 
issues seamlessly, however 
application test plans need to be 









The designer will ensure the 
application is compliant with 
IPv6 multicast addressing 
and features an IPv6 
network configuration 
options as defined in RFC 
4038. 
Java has IPv6 support built in and 
will attempt to handle IPv6/IPv4 
issues seamlessly, however 
application test plans need to be 




The designer will ensure the 
application is compliant with 
the IPv6 addressing scheme 
as defined in RFC 1884.  
Java has IPv6 support built in and 
will attempt to handle IPv6/IPv4 
issues seamlessly, however 
application test plans need to be 




The Release Manager will 
develop an SCM plan 
describing the configuration 
control and change 
management process of 
objects developed and the 
roles and responsibilities of 
the organization. 
Develop a SCM plan for MAST. It 
must describe configuration control 
and change management process 
APP4040 
Medium 
The Release Manager will 
establish a Configuration 
Control Board (CCB) that 
meets at least every release 
cycle, for managing the CM 
process. 
Establish a CCB to support and 
execute the SCM for MAST. 
APP4050 
Medium 
The release manager must 
ensure application files are 
cryptographically hashed 
prior to deploying to DOD 
operational networks. 
Within the SCM, create processes to 
hash new releases of MAST Also, 
ensure that those hashes are 
included in MAST releases. 
APP5040 
Medium 
The Test Manager will 
ensure the changes to the 
application are assessed for 
IA and accreditation impact 
prior to implementation. 
MAST does not have a documented 
test program. In developing that 
program, include the development 
and execution IA tests for MAST.  
APP5050 
Medium 
The Test Manager will 
ensure tests plans and 
procedures are created and 
executed prior to each 
release of the application or 
updates to system patches. 
Develop a test program for MAST. 
Ensure, as part of the program, that 








The Test Manager will 
ensure test procedures are 
created and at least annually 
executed to ensure system 
initialization, shutdown, and 
aborts are configured to 
ensure the system remains 
in a secure state. 
Develop a test program for MAST. 
Ensure, as part of the program, that 
tests are included that the system 
remains in a secure state, through 
shutdown, startup, and other overall 
system state changes. 
APP5080 
Medium 
The Test Manager will 
ensure a code review is 
performed before the 
application is released. 
Develop a test program for MAST. 
Ensure, as part of the program, that 
code review is included. 
APP5090 
Medium 
The Test Manager will 
ensure flaws found during a 
code review are tracked in a 
defect tracking system. 
Develop a test program for MAST. 
Ensure, as part of the program, that 
findings from code review are 
tracked and resolved. 
APP5100 
Medium 
The IAO will ensure active 
vulnerability testing is 
performed. 




The Test Manager will 
ensure security flaws are 
fixed or addressed in the 
project plan. 
Develop a test program for MAST. 
Ensure, as part of the program, that 
security flaws are fixed. 
APP6010 
Medium 
The IAO will ensure if an 
application is designated 
critical, the application is not 
hosted on a general purpose 
machine. 
MAST development platforms and 
environments require an IAO and IA 
processes to ensure secure 




The IAO will ensure 
unnecessary services are 
disabled or removed. 
MAST development platforms and 
environments require an IAO and IA 
processes to ensure secure 




The IAO will ensure at least 
one application administrator 
has registered to receive 
update notifications, or 
security alerts, when 
automated alerts are 
available. 
MAST development platforms and 
environments require an IAO and IA 
processes to ensure secure 









The IAO will ensure the 
system and installed 
applications have current 
patches, security updates, 
and configuration settings. 
MAST development platforms and 
environments require an IAO and IA 
processes to ensure secure 




The IAO will ensure the 
application is 
decommissioned when 
maintenance or support is no 
longer available. 
MAST development platforms and 
environments require an IAO and IA 
processes to ensure secure 




The IAO will ensure 
protections against DoS 
attacks are implemented. 
MAST development platforms and 
environments require an IAO and IA 
processes to ensure secure 




The IAO will ensure 
application audit trails are 
retained for at least 1 year 
for applications without SAMI 
data, and 5 years for 
applications including SAMI 
data. 
MAST development platforms and 
environments require an IAO and IA 
processes to ensure secure 




The IAO will ensure recovery 
procedures and technical 
system features exist so 
recovery is performed in a 
secure and verifiable 
manner. The IAO will 
document circumstances 
inhibiting a trusted recovery.      
MAST development platforms and 
environments require an IAO and IA 
processes to ensure secure 




The IAO will ensure back-up 
copies of the application 
software are stored in a fire-
rated container and not 
collocated with operational 
software. 
MAST development platforms and 
environments require an IAO and IA 
processes to ensure secure 




The IAO will ensure 
procedures are in place to 
assure the appropriate 
physical and technical 
protection of the backup and 
restoration of the application. 
MAST development platforms and 
environments require an IAO and IA 
processes to ensure secure 









The IAO will ensure data 
backup is performed at 
required intervals in 
accordance with DOD policy. 
MAST development platforms and 
environments require an IAO and IA 
processes to ensure secure 




The IAO will ensure a 
disaster recovery plan exists 
in accordance with DOD 
policy based on the Mission 
Assurance Category (MAC). 
MAST development platforms and 
environments require an IAO and IA 
processes to ensure secure 




In this chapter, a threat model for MAST was developed and then utilized 
to propose mitigations to vulnerabilities in MAST’s architecture. Particular areas 
of concern were determined to be in Application Tier-to-Tier Trust and Simware 
Trust. Following the threat model, findings that would not be apparent in a threat 
model are enumerated along with their corresponding mitigations. The next 
chapter concludes the research and discusses future research opportunities. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter discusses conclusions from this research and opportunities 
for future work. 
A. CONCLUSION 
This thesis was driven by the need to determine the weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities within MAST and steps to be taken to prepare it for deployment on 
an operational platform, focusing specifically on security concerns.   
The SCA was executed based on [1], the primary guidance document for 
DOD secure application development and deployment. Following the SCA, a risk 
analysis was conducted via threat modeling methodology. The threat model 
defines vulnerabilities to confidentiality, availability, and integrity and supported 
mitigations approaches to resolve those findings. 
In Chapter IV, the SCA determined that MAST has several CAT I, CAT II 
and CATII findings. Should these findings be left unaddressed, MAST would not 
be able to acquire an ATO. 
In Chapter V, the threat model determined critical risk areas in which 
future efforts should be targeted to get MAST ready for deployment.   
At this stage in its development, MAST is not ready for deployment in an 
operation environment, beyond strictly limited and controlled test events. This 
research has shown that MAST has several major rectifications necessary to 
operate securely.   
Once properly hardened, MAST will provide unique opportunity for 
advancing information system operators’ cyber readiness. MAST shows great 
promise in its utilization as a training device to ready the cyber workforce to 
manage real-life cyber risks. 
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B. FUTURE WORK 
The SCA has identified several opportunities for improvement to MAST, 
following what has been done in this thesis, particularly to implement vulnerability 
mitigations. Each of the vulnerabilities identified by this research is significant 
enough to warrant future research and development. 
1. Application Tier-to-Tier Trust  
The Tier-to-Tier Trust problem requires significant research and 
development in order to determine how to effectively meet confidentiality and 
integrity needs. Key-exchange for encryption between tiers and authentication 
represent significant challenges that warrant further research. 
2. Simware Trust 
In order to deploy a complete code signing and validation program MAST 
may require significant extensions. Success of a secure distribution system 
would require a single source for Simware in order to protect signing signatures.   
Because of the intensity of change to MAST to support this, there is great 
opportunity in pursuing this researching and developing this solution. 
3. Additional SCA 
This SCA was based on version 3, release 8 of the ASD STIG [1], which 
was the current release when this research began. The ASD STIG has been 
updated twice while this research was underway and upon completion, the ASD 
STIG was at version 3, release 10. As secure development practices are 
constantly evolving and improving, these updates are to be expected. If the 
mitigations proposed in this research are implemented, a very different and much 




APPENDIX. DISA APPLICATION SECURITY STIG AREAS  
Table 18.  DISA Application Security STIG Areas, shows what focus areas 
each test from the Application Security and Development STIG apply to. An “X” 
indicates that a test applies to that particular focus area.   
Table 18.   DISA Application Security STIG Areas, after [1] 





















































The designer will ensure applications 
requiring user authentication are PK-
enabled and are designed and 
implemented to support hardware tokens 




   
V-6128 
The designer and IAO will ensure PK-
enabled applications are designed and 
implemented to use approved credentials 




   
V-6129 
The designer will ensure the application 
using PKI validates certificates for 
expiration, confirms origin is from a DOD 
authorized CA, and verifies the certificate 
has not been revoked by CRL or OCSP, 





   
V-6130 
The designer will ensure the application 
has the capability to require account 







The designer will ensure the application 





   
V-6132 The IAO will ensure all user accounts are IAAC-1, IAIA-1 
    
X 
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disabled which are authorized to have 
access to the application but have not 
authenticated within the past 35 days. 
V-6133 
The IAO will ensure unnecessary built-in 
application accounts are disabled. 
IAIA-1 
    
X 
V-6134 
The IAO will ensure default passwords 
are changed. 
IAIA-1 
    
X 
V-6135 
The designer will ensure the appropriate 
cryptography is used to protect stored 






   
V-6136 
The designer will ensure data transmitted 
through a commercial or wireless network 








   
V-6137 
The designer will ensure the application 
uses the Federal Information Processing 
Standard (FIPS) 140–2 validated 
cryptographic modules and random 
number generator if the application 
implements encryption, key exchange, 








   
V-6138 
The designer will ensure the application 
design includes audits on all access to 






   
V-6139 
The designer will ensure the application 
has a capability to notify an administrator 
when audit logs are nearing capacity as 




   
V-6140 
The designer and IAO will ensure the 



























































application and auditors and protected 
against modification and deletion by 
unauthorized individuals. 
V-6141 
The designer will ensure access control 
mechanisms exist to ensure data is 






   
V-6142 
The designer will ensure all access 
authorizations to data are revoked prior to 
initial assignment, allocation or 




   
V-6143 
The designer will ensure the application 
executes with no more privileges than 




   
V-6144 
The designer will ensure the application 
provides a capability to limit the number 





   
V-6145 
If the application contains classified data, 
the Program Manager will ensure a 
Security Classification Guide exists 
containing data elements and their 
classification. 
DCSD-1 X 
   
X 
V-6146 
The designer will ensure the application 
has the capability to mark 




   
V-6147 
The Test Manager will ensure the 
application does not modify data files 
outside the scope of the application. 
ECRC-1 




The designer will ensure threat models 
are documented and reviewed for each 



























































required by design and functionality 
changes or new threats are discovered. 
V-6149 
The designer will ensure the application 
does not contain source code that is 
never invoked during operation, except 
for software components and libraries 




   
V-6150 
The Designer will ensure the application 
does not store configuration and control 




   
V-6151 
The IAO will ensure unnecessary 
services are disabled or removed. 
DCSD-1 
    
X 
V-6152 
The designer will ensure the application 
is capable of displaying a customizable 
click-through banner at logon which 
prevents further activity on the 
information system unless and until the 
user executes a positive action to 





   
V-6153 
The designer will ensure the application 
removes authentication credentials on 





   
V-6154 
The designer will ensure the application 
is organized by functionality and roles to 
support the assignment of specific roles 







The designer will ensure the application 
provides a capability to terminate a 




   
V-6156 The designer will ensure the application IAIA-1, IAIA-2 
 
X 
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does not contain embedded 
authentication data. 
V-6157 
The designer will ensure the application 





   
V-6158 
The designer will ensure the application 
only embeds mobile code in email which 
does not execute automatically when the 




   
V-6159 
The designer will ensure unsigned 
Category 1A mobile code is not used in 





   
V-6160 
The designer will ensure unsigned 
Category 2 mobile code executing in a 
constrained environment has no access 




   
V-6161 
The designer will ensure signed Category 
1A and Category 2 mobile code signature 




   
V-6162 
The designer will ensure uncategorized 





   
V-6163 
The Designer will ensure the application 
removes temporary storage of files and 





   
V-6164 
The designer will ensure the application 




   
V-6165 
The designer will ensure the application 
does not have buffer overflows, use 
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overflows, and does not use signed 
values for memory allocation where 
permitted by the programming language. 
V-6166 
The designer will ensure the application 





   
V-6167 
The designer will ensure application 
initialization, shutdown, and aborts are 





   
V-6168 
The designer will ensure applications 





   
V-6169 
The Program Manager and designer will 
ensure the application design complies 
with the DOD Ports and Protocols 
guidance. 




The Program Manager and designer will 
ensure any IA, or IA enabled, products 
used by the application are NIAP 
approved or in the NIAP approval 
process. 
DCAS-1 X X 
   
V-6171 
The IAO will ensure recovery procedures 
and technical system features exist so 
recovery is performed in a secure and 
verifiable manner.      The IAO will 




CODP-3     
X 
V-6172 
The IAO will ensure data backup is 
performed at required intervals in 
accordance with DOD policy. 
CODB-1, 
CODB-2, 
CODB-3     
X 
V-6173 The IAO will ensure application audit ECRR-1 
    
X 
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trails are retained for at least 1 year for 
applications without SAMI data, and 5 
years for applications including SAMI 
data. 
V-6174 
The IAO will ensure production database 
exports have database administration 
credentials and sensitive data removed 
before releasing the export. 
ECAN-1 
    
X 
V-6197 
The Program Manager will ensure a 
System Security Plan (SSP) is 
established to describe the technical, 
administrative, and procedural IA 
program and policies governing the DOD 
information system, and identifying all IA 
personnel and specific IA requirements 
and objectives. 
DCSD-1 X 
   
X 
V-6198 
The Program Manager and IAO will 
ensure development systems, build 
systems, test systems, and all 
components comply with all appropriate 
DOD STIGs, NSA guides, and all 
applicable DOD policies. The Test 
Manager will ensure both client and 








The designer will create and update the 





   
V-16773 
The Program Manager will provide an 
Application Configuration Guide to the 
application hostingproviders to include a 
list of all potential hosting enclaves and 






V-16775 The Program Manager will ensure the DCSD-1 X 
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system has been assigned specific MAC 
and confidentiality levels. 
V-16776 
The Program Manager will ensure the 
development team follows a set of coding 
standards. 
DCSQ-1 X X 
   
V-16777 
The Program Manager will ensure COTS 
IA and IA enabled products, comply with 





    
V-16778 
The Program Manager will document and 
obtain DAA risk acceptance for all public 
domain, shareware, freeware, and other 
software products/libraries with both (1) 
no source code to review, repair, and 
extend, and (2) limited or no warranty,  
when such products are required for 
mission accomplishment. 
DCPD-1 X X 
   
V-16779 
The Program Manager and designer will 
ensure the application is registered with 
the DOD Ports and Protocols Database. 




The Program Manager will ensure all 
levels of program management, 
designers, developers, and testers 
receive the appropriate security training 
pertaining to their job function. 
PRTN-1 X 
    
V-16781 
The Program Manager will  ensure a 
vulnerability management process is in 
place to include ensuring a mechanism is 
in place to notify users, and users are 
provided with a means of obtaining 




    
V-16782 
The Program Manager will ensure a 
security incident response process for the 
VIIR-1, VIIR-2 X 
   
X 
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application is established that defines 
reportable incidents and outlines a 
standard operating procedure for incident 
response to include Information 
Operations Condition (INFOCON). 
V-16783 
The Program Manager will ensure 
procedures are implemented to assure 
physical handling and storage of 
information is in accordance with the 
data’s sensitivity. 
PESP-1 X 
   
X 
V-16784 
The designer will ensure the user 
interface services are physically or 





   
V-16785 
The designer will ensure the application 
supports detection and/or prevention of 




   
V-16786 
The designer will ensure the application 
installs with unnecessary functionality 




   
V-16787 
The designer will ensure the application 




   
V-16788 
The designer will ensure the application 
uses encryption to implement key 
exchange and authenticate endpoints 
prior to establishing a communication 




   
V-16789 
The designer will ensure private keys are 




   
V-16790 
The designer will ensure the application 
does not connect to a database using 
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privileged database accounts. 
V-16791 
The designer will ensure transaction 
based applications implement transaction 




   
V-16792 
The designer will ensure sensitive data 
held in memory is cryptographically 
protected when not in use, if required by 
the information owner, and classified data 
held in memory is always 






   
V-16793 
The designer will ensure the application 
properly clears or overwrites all memory 
blocks used to process sensitive data, if 
required by the information owner, and 
clears or overwrites all memory blocks 





   
V-16794 
The designer will ensure the application 
uses mechanisms assuring the integrity 
of all transmitted information (including 




   
V-16795 
The designer will ensure the application 





   
V-16796 
The designer will ensure the application 
transmits account passwords in an 




   
V-16797 
The designer will ensure the application 





   
V-16798 The designer will ensure the application ECCD-1 
 
X 
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protects access to authentication data by 
restricting access to authorized users and 
services. 
V-16799 
The designer will ensure the application 
installs with unnecessary accounts 




   
V-16800 
The designer will ensure users’ accounts 
are locked after three consecutive 





   
V-16801 
The designer will ensure locked users’ 





   
V-16802 
The designer will ensure the application 
provides a capability to automatically 
terminate a session and log out after a 





   
V-16803 
The designer and IAO will ensure 
application resources are protected with 
permission sets which allow only an 
application administrator to modify 







The designer will ensure the application 
does not rely solely on a resource name 




   
V-16806 
The designer will ensure the web 
application assigns the character set on 




   
V-16807 
The designer will ensure the application 
is not vulnerable to SQL Injection, uses 
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does not use concatenation or 
replacement to build SQL queries, and 
does not directly access the tables in a 
database. 
V-16808 
The designer will ensure the application 





   
V-16809 
The designer will ensure the application 





   
V-16810 
The designer will ensure the application 




   
V-16811 
The designer will ensure the application 





   
V-16812 
The designer will ensure the application 





   
V-16813 
The designer will ensure the application 
does not use hidden fields to control user 





   
V-16814 
The designer will ensure the application 
does not disclose unnecessary 




   
V-16815 
The designer will ensure the application 




   
V-16816 
The designer will ensure the application 
supports the creation of transaction logs 




   
V-16817 The designer will ensure the application ECLO-2 
 
X 
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has a capability to notify the user of 
important login information. 
V-16818 
The designer will ensure the application 
has a capability to display the user’s time 





   
V-16819 
The designer will ensure development of 
new mobile code includes measures to 




   
V-16820 
The Release Manager will ensure the 
access privileges to the configuration 
management (CM) repository are 
reviewed every 3 months. 
ECPC-1, 




The Release Manager will develop an 
SCM plan describing the configuration 
control and change management process 
of objects developed and the roles and 
responsibilities of the organization. 
DCPR-1, 




The Release Manager will establish a 
Configuration Control Board (CCB), that 
meets at least every release cycle, for 
managing the CM process. 
DCCB-1, 




The Test Manager will ensure at least 
one tester is designated to test for 
security flaws in addition to functional 
testing. 
DCSQ-1 




The Test Manager will ensure the 
changes to the application are assessed 
for IA and accreditation impact prior to 
implementation. 
DCII-1 




The Test Manager will ensure tests plans 
and procedures are created and executed 
DCCT-1 
























































prior to each release of the application or 
updates to system patches. 
V-16827 
The Test Manager will ensure test 
procedures are created and at least 
annually executed to ensure system 
initialization, shutdown, and aborts are 
configured to ensure the system remains 
in a secure state. 
DCSS-2 




The Test Manager will ensure code 
coverage statistics are maintained for 
each release of the application. 
DCSQ-1 




The Test Manager will ensure a code 
review is performed before the application 
is released. 
DCSQ-1 




The Test Manager will ensure flaws 
found during a code review are tracked in 
a defect tracking system. 
DCSQ-1 




The IAO will ensure active vulnerability 
testing is performed. 
DCSQ-1 




The Test Manager will ensure security 
flaws are fixed or addressed in the project 
plan. 
DCSQ-1 




The IAO will ensure if an application is 
designated critical, the application is not 
hosted on a general purpose machine. 
DCSQ-1 
    
X 
V-16834 
The IAO shall ensure if a DOD STIG or 
NSA guide is not available, a third-party 
product will be configured by the following 
in descending order as available: 1) 
commercially accepted practices, (2) 
independent testing results, or (3) vendor 
literature. 
DCCS-1 
    
X 
 86 





















































The IAO will ensure at least one 
application administrator has registered to 
receive update notifications, or security 
alerts, when automated alerts are 
available. 
DCCT-1 
    
X 
V-16836 
The IAO will ensure the system and 
installed applications have current 
patches, security updates, and 
configuration settings. 
DCCT-1 
    
X 
V-16837 
The IAO will ensure the application is 
decommissioned when maintenance or 
support is no longer available. 
DCSD-1, 
ECSC-1     
X 
V-16838 
Procedures are not in place to notify 
users when an application is 
decommissioned. 
DCSD-1 
    
X 
V-16839 
The IAO will ensure protections against 
DoS attacks are implemented. 
DCSQ-1 
    
X 
V-16840 
The IAO will ensure the system alerts an 
administrator when low resource 
conditions are encountered. 
ECAT-2 
    
X 
V-16841 
The IAO will review audit trails 
periodically based on system 
documentation recommendations or 
immediately upon system security events. 
ECCD-2 
    
X 
V-16842 
The IAO will report all suspected 
violations of IA policies in accordance 
with DOD information system IA 
procedures. 
ECAT-2 
    
X 
V-16843 
The IAO will ensure, for classified 
systems, application audit trails are 
continuously and automatically 
monitored, and alerts are provided 
ECAT-2 
    
X 
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immediately when unusual or 
inappropriate activity is detected. 
V-16844 
The IAO will ensure back-up copies of 
the application software are stored in a 
fire-rated container and not collocated 
with operational software. 
COSW-1 
    
X 
V-16845 
The IAO will ensure procedures are in 
place to assure the appropriate physical 
and technical protection of the backup 
and restoration of the application. 
COBR-1 
    
X 
V-16846 
The IAO will ensure a disaster recovery 
plan exists in accordance with DOD 




CODP-3     
X 
V-16847 
The IAO will ensure an account 
management process is implemented, 
verifying only authorized users can gain 
access to the application, and individual 
accounts designated as inactive, 
suspended, or terminated are promptly 
removed. 
IAAC-1 
    
X 
V-16848 
The IAO will ensure passwords 
generated for users are not predictable 
and comply with the organization’s 
password policy. 
IAIA-1, IAIA-2 
    
X 
V-16849 
The IAO will ensure the application’s 
users do not use shared accounts. 
IAGA-1 
    
X 
V-16850 
The IAO will ensure connections between 
the DOD enclave and the Internet or 
other public or commercial wide area 
networks require a DMZ. 
EBPW-1 
    
X 
V-19687 The IAO will ensure web servers are on DCPA-1 
    
X 
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logically separate network segments from 
the application and database servers if it 
is a tiered application. 
V-19688 
The designer and the IAO will ensure 
physical operating system separation and 
physical application separation is 
employed between servers of different 
data types in the web tier of Increment 
1/Phase 1 deployment of the DOD DMZ 
for Internet-facing applications. 
DCPA-1 
    
X 
V-19689 
The designer will ensure web services 
are designed and implemented to 
recognize and react to the attack patterns 





   
V-19690 
The designer will ensure the web service 





   
V-19691 
The designer will ensure web service 
design of critical functions is implemented 
using different algorithms to prevent 
similar attacks from forming a complete 




   
V-19692 
The designer will ensure web services 
are designed to prioritize requests to 




   
V-19693 
The designer will ensure execution flow 
diagrams are created and used to 




   
V-19694 
The IAO will ensure an XML firewall is 
deployed to protect web services. 
DCSQ-1 
    
X 
V-19695 The designer will ensure web services DCSQ-1 
 
X 
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provide a mechanism for detecting 
resubmitted SOAP messages. 
V-19696 
The designer and IAO will ensure digital 
signatures exist on UDDI registry entries 







The designer and IAO will ensure UDDI 
versions are used supporting digital 







The designer and IAO will ensure UDDI 








The IAO will ensure web service inquiries 
to UDDI provide read-only access to the 
registry to anonymous users. 
ECLP-1 
    
X 
V-19700 
The IAO will ensure if the UDDI registry 
contains sensitive information and read 
access to the UDDI registry is granted 
only to authenticated users. 
ECCR-1, 
ECCR-2     
X 
V-19701 
The designer will ensure SOAP 
messages requiring integrity, sign the 
following message elements:-Message 
ID-Service Request-Timestamp-SAML 





   
V-19702 
The designer will ensure when using WS-
Security, messages use timestamps with 




   
V-19703 
The designer will ensure validity periods 
are verified on all messages using WS-




   
V-19704 
The designer shall ensure each unique 
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ID references for each SAML assertion. 
V-19705 
The designer shall ensure encrypted 
assertions, or equivalent confidentiality 
protections, when assertion data is 
passed through an intermediary, and 
confidentiality of the assertion data is 




   
V-19706 
The designer will ensure the application 
is compliant with all DOD IT Standards 




   
V-19707 
The designer will ensure supporting 
application services and interfaces have 





   
V-19708 
The designer will ensure the application 
is compliant with IPv6 multicast 
addressing and features an IPv6 network 





   
V-19709 
The designer will ensure the application 
is compliant with the IPv6 addressing 




   
V-21498 
The designer will ensure the application 




   
V-21500 
The designer will ensure the application 




   
V-21519 
The Program Manager will ensure all 
products are supported by the vendor or 
the development team. 
DCSQ-1 X 
    
V-22028 
The designer shall use the NotOnOrAfter 
property when using the 
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The designer shall use both the 
<NotBefore> and <NotOnOrAfter> 
elements or <OneTimeUse> element 
when using the <Conditions> element in 




   
V-22030 
The designer will ensure the asserting 
party uses FIPS approved random 
numbers in the generation of 





   
V-22031 
The designer shall ensure messages are 
encrypted when the SessionIndex is tied 




   
V-22032 
The designer shall ensure if a 
OneTimeUse element is used in an 
assertion, there is only one used in the 





   
V-47163 
The release manager must ensure 
application files are cryptographically 
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